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THE EFFECT OF PROFESSIONAL
INCORPORATION ON AN
ORGANIZATION'S LIABILITY TO
SHAREHOLDERS UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT OF 1967
Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, P.C.'
INTRODUCTION
Modern America is preoccupied with youth. As the average life expect-
ancy has increased, 2 a greater number of older workers have joined the ranks
1. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
2. In 1920, the average life expectancy at birth was 54.1 years. By 1960, it
had risen to 69.7 years, and was greater than 70 years in 1965. In 1984, according
to preliminary calculations, the average infant could expect to live 74.7 years. These
figures are reflected in the following chart:
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of American laborers.3 Consequently, concern has developed over the em-
ployment well-being of this group. When the median age dropped below
twenty-eight in the 1960's, 4 a noticeable trend existed whereby employers
preferred younger workers to their older counterparts.5 In his 1967 Older
Americans message to Congress, 6 President Johnson addressed the negative
impact of discrimination against workers over the age of forty-five. Of all
unemployed individuals, 27 percent were above age forty-five, and of the
long-term unemployed, 40 percent fell into this category.7 The general plight
3. Projections of the Total Population By Race, Sex, and Age: 1985-2000
Age 1985 1990 2000
0-5 18,453,000 19,198,000 17,626,000
5-17 44,385,000 45,139,000 49,763,000
18-24 28,739,000 25,794,000 24,601,000
25-44 73,792,000 81,376,000 80,158,000
45-64 44,652,000 46,453,000 60,886,000
65- 28,608,000 31,697,000 34,921,000
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1986, 10 (1986).







BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMENCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1986, 25 (1986).
5. Congressman Perkins, in 1967, stated:
The setting of the specific age limitation beyond which an employer will not
consider a worker for a vacant job regardless of ability has become a com-
mon practice. That is what we are trying to eliminate here. In the States
that do not prohibit such practices, over half of all employers are presently
applying such limitations using maximum age limits typically set at 45 to 55
years of age.
In other words, approximately one-half of the job openings which de-
velop in the private economy each year are closed to applicants over the age
of 55 years. Mr. Speaker, one-quarter of these jobs are closed to applicants
over 45 years of age and even a greater percent are closed to applicants over
the age of 55 years.
The same report shows - that is, the report that has been made of the
matter by the Employment Service of the U.S. Department of Labor - that
in 70 percent of the establishments surveyed by the Employment Service,
less than 5 percent of the newly hired are workers over the age of 45, and
that one-half of all our workers in this age group constitute anywhere from
25 to 30 percent of the unemployed.
113 CoNG. REc. H34741 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1967) (statement of Rep. Perkins).
6. Special Message to the Congress Proposing Programs for Older Ameri-
cans, PUB. PAPERS 32-39 (Jan. 23, 1967).
7. Id. at 37. The President's message, in the section on job opportunities,
[Vol. 52
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of and hope for these older persons was eloquently described by President
Johnson:
Too many of our senior citizens have been left behind by the progress they
worked most of their lives to create.... We should look upon the growing
number of older (Americans) not as a problem or a burden for our de-
mocracy, but as an opportunity to enrich their lives and, through them, the
lives of all of us.,
During the Congressional debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the pos-
sibility of including a category of age discrimination in employment was
discussed.9 Although this did not come to fruition then, a study was initiated
to investigate the proposal.'0 The Secretary of Labor prepared a report which
indicated pervasive discrimination against older workers in American soci-
ety." These findings culminated in passage of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).12
stated:
Hundreds of thousands, not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find them-
selves jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination. Despite our present
low rate of unemployment, there has been a persistent average of 850,000
people age 45 and over who are unemployed. Today more than three-quarters
of the billion dollars in unemployment insurance is paid each year to workers
who are 45 and over.
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEWS, 2213, 2214 (1967).
8. 113 CONG. REC. H34749 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1967) (statement of Rep.
Halpern quoting President Johnson).
9. McKenry, Enforcement of Age Discrimination in Employment Legisla-
tion, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1157, 1158 (1981).
10. 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEWS, 2213, 2214:
Over the last several years a number of bills have been introduced in
both the House and Senate to bar discrimination in employment on account
of age. . . . It followed then, for section 715 of Public Law 88-352 (Civil
Rights Act of 1964) to direct the Secretary of Labor to make a study of the
problem of age discrimination in employment .... In his report, the Sec-
retary recommended ... : "The possibility of new nonstatutory means of
dealing with such arbitrary discrimination has been explored. That area is
barren.... A clear cut and implemented federal policy.., would provide
a foundation for a much-needed nationwide campaign to promote hiring
without discrimination on the basis of age."
Id. A newspaper article at the time discussed the significance of the problem:
In a comprehensive 1965 study, the Labor Department found that during
the previous year, job-seekers over 45 years old accounted for 27 per cent
of the unemployed. Only 8.6 per cent of new workers hired by companies
surveyed were over 45 - less than one-third this age group's proportion
among the jobless. Public employment offices queried said older workers
constituted about 30 per cent of all applicants registered for employment.
Murchison, Sorry, You're Too Old For Us, Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 19, 1967, at
2, col. 3.
11. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESs ON AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIvI RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 at 5-19 (1965).
19871
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From its inception, caselaw on the ADEA has not been overly abundant.
Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, P.C., 3 is an important decision,
because it adopts different interpretations of key definitions in the ADEA
from those previously used by other circuits in the employment discrimination
law area. Specifically, the Court in Hyland formulated a rigid definition of
"employee" for situations where the organization/employer involved is a
professional corporation. 4 The Second Circuit refused to characterize the
professional corporation as a partnership, regardless of how the business was
operated, and held that a shareholder could be classified as an "employee."' 5
Approaching the problem from a different perspective, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in EEOC v. Dowd & Dowda6 found that shareholders in a professional
corporation were, in reality, more akin to "partners" than "employees."' 7
The EEOC filed a complaint on behalf of a woman who was undoubtedly
an "employee" for purposes of a sex discrimination suit; 8 however, the
parties disputed whether the professional corporation was a proper employer/
defendant. Title VII requires an organization to have at least fifteen "em-
ployees" to be an "employer" within the meaning of the act. 19
As yet the split between the Second and Seventh Circuits created by
Hyland has not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court. There
exists a multiplicity of approaches to interpreting amorphous definitional
provisions contained in employment discrimination legislation. This Note will
discuss the various tests utilized by the federal courts to determine if the
requisite employment relationship exists for the ADEA to apply. To under-
stand the foregoing dilemma of form over substance faced by the courts, it
is necessary to focus on the development of the ADEA itself.
One of the primary aims of the ADEA was to eradicate mandatory
retirement. 0 For one to have standing under the ADEA, he must be over
Once a person over 45 loses a job, the chances against finding another like it are 6
to 1 against him. 113 CONG. REC. H34752 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1967) (statement of Rep.
Dwyer).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982); see also McKenry, supra note 9, at 1158.
13. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
14. Id. at 798.
15. Id.
16. 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984). The EEOC sued Dowd & Dowd, alleging
that the professional corporation of attorneys violated Title VII by failing to amend
its Health Benefits Plan to include pregnancy benefits for its female employees by
the effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Id. at 1177.
17. Id. at 1178.
18. Id. at 1177.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). As to the ADEA, see infra note 30 and accom-
panying text.
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(b)(1) (1985).
[Vol. 52
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the age of forty at the time of the alleged discrimination. 2' This Act makes
it "unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's age."2 As a measure to address this discrimination,
Congress enumerated three purposes of the ADEA: (1) to promote older
worker employment based on ability instead of age; (2) to eliminate arbitrary
age discrimination; and (3) to assist workers and employers in coping with
the problems faced by age in employment.23
Originally, the Department of Labor was given authority to enforce the
legislation, 24 but President Carter transferred this duty to the Equal Em-
21. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982). Originally, the ADEA required a complainant
to be between the ages of forty and sixty-five, and later the ceiling was raised to age
seventy. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 12(a),
92 Stat. 189 (1978). Additionally, the ADEA provides that it shall be unlawful for
an employer:
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982). For the complete text of the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). It is the purpose of
H.R. 13054 [ADEA] to promote the employment of older workers based on their
ability. This would be done through an education and information program to assist
employers and employees in meeting employment problems which are real and dis-
pelling those which are illusory, and through the utilization of informal and formal
remedial procedures. The prohibitions in the bill apply to employers, employment
agencies and labor organizations. See U.S. CODE CONG. & Aozm'N. NEws 2213 (1967).
Section 621 of the Act provides the congressional statement of findings and purpose:
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that-
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and espe-
cially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable
practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment
with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is,
relative to the younger ages, high among older workers; their numbers are
great and growing; and their employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary discrim-
ination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the free flow
of goods in commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1982).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
24. See U.S.C. §§ 625-626 (Supp. 1969).
1987]
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ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 1978.21 Because many of the
provisions of Title VII and the ADEA overlap, President Carter reasoned
that the EEOC would be better equipped to handle the burgeoning ADEA
matters. 2
6
In addition, since most of the definitional provisions of the ADEA, Title
VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) are nearly identical, courts
construing the ADEA have relied on judicial interpretation of these other
antidiscrimination acts. 27 When interpreting the particular statutory defini-
tions, courts will attempt to discover the legislative intent underlying them.U
Courts have consistently stated that the ADEA is to be interpreted broadly
so that its intended purposes may be effectuated. 29
As used in the ADEA the term "employer" refers to "[a] person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees. . .. "10
The term "employee," vaguely enough, refers to an individual employed by
an employer." Because of its conclusory nature, this latter definition has
proven difficult for courts to apply.
A significant problem created by the vague definition of "employee,"
is whether or not it is mutually exclusive with the term "partner." To answer
this question, sources outside the ADEA should be employed as well as
general rules of statutory construction. The term "partnership" has been
variously defined, but perhaps the best definition is contained in the Uniform
Partnership Act (UPA): "A partnership is an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit. '32 Almost every state
has adopted the UPA, and the provision enumerating the rights and duties
of partners is appropriate in solving the employee/partner dilemma: "[a]ll
partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership
business." 33 Should a partnership be considered an entity separate and distinct
25. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1978).
26. Remarks Announcing Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 1 PUB. PAPERS
398, 403 (1978).
27. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.
1986) (discussing the approaches taken by courts in interpreting the ADEA).
28. When a question arises concerning applicability of a statute a decision
can be reached only by applying some kind of a criterion. For the inter-
pretation of statutes, "intent of the legislature" is the criterion that is most
often recited. An overwhelming majority of judicial opinions considering
statutory issues are written in the context of legislative intent. The reason
for this lies in an assumption that an obligation to construe statutes so that
they carry out the will, real or attributed, of the lawmaking branch of the
government is mandated by principles of separation of powers.
SUTHERLAND, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 45.05 (1984).
29. See, e.g., Hyland, 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1986).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1983).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1983).
32. UzNrn. PARTNERsmP ACT § 6(1) (1969).
33. Id. at § 18(e).
[Vol. 52
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from the individual partners, or should it be deemed an extension of the
partners themselves, without its own legal existence? The UPA does not
answer this question with certainty; rather, its characterization of a partner-
ship's legal status is ambiguous. The true nature of a partnership may be
broken down into two theories: the aggregate theory and the entity theory,
both of which are contained in the UPA.34
At common law, the aggregate theory of partnerships was used almost
exclusively.35 Under this doctrine a partnership is viewed as the totality of
individuals engaged in a business or joint enterprise, without its own identity
under the law. 6 Because of the characterization of a partnership as an ag-
gregate for some purposes under the UPA, a partnership cannot sue or be
sued in the organization's name without a permissive statute. 37 A partnership
cannot be an employer under the aggregate theory, instead the individual
partners, singly and as a group, comprise the "employer." 3 As a result, the
ADEA and Title VII (implied from their definitions of "employer"), dictate
that partners do not pass the necessary employment relationship test because
partners are not employees. 39
The entity theory, on the other hand, creates a legal fiction that enables
a partnership to be a unit with a recognized capacity of having legal rights
and being subject to legal dutiesA° Unlike a corporation, a partnership at
common law was not deemed an artificial person with a separate legal ex-
istence apart from its members. Instead of individual partners being classified
as employers, the partnership as an entity is the sole employer. Conceptually,
this enables a partner to be viewed as an employee in some instances. Despite
the aggregate theory being ostensibly chosen by the UPA, entity-based pro-
visions are pervasive in the act. 41 Therefore, depending on the situation in-
volved, either theory may be utilized so that the intended purposes of the
UPA will be realized. 42
CASE ANALYSIS
Plaintiff-appellant, John Hyland, M.D., and four other physicians were
the founding members of defendant-appellee New Haven Radiology Asso-
34. Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act An Aggregate
or An Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REv. 377, 381 (1963).
35. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS, 77 (1986).
36. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 60 (5th ed. 1979).
37. L. SMITH & G. ROBERSON, Busnmss LAW 623 (1982).
38. Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977).
39. Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 354 (7th Cir.
1983).
40. L. SMITH, supra note 37, at 623.
41. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW oF PARTNERSHIP 16 (1968).
42. Jensen, supra note 34, at 381.
1987]
7
Salveter: Salveter: Effect of Professional Incorporation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1987
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
ciates, P.C. (NHRA). 41 All physician-shareholders held positions as officers
and directors of the corporation. 4 Pursuant to the terms of the stockholders'
agreement, each member shared equally in profits and losses of the corpo-
ration. After making equal contributions of capital, shares of the professional
corporation were divided evenly among the shareholders, who acquired cer-
tain rights in the management of the association.45
In order to maintain the initial form of the organization, provisions were
made in the shareholders' agreement for additional radiologists to become
"Stockholder-Employees," who would also acquire rights of management
equal with the other members.46 At the resignation, death or termination of
any member, the NHRA was required to purchase that member's stock at a
price determined by the valuation provisions of the agreement. 47
During the entire term of a two year employment contract signed by the
shareholders, each was to remain "a full time employee of the com-
pany .... ,,41 Each doctor was further required to turn over to the corpo-
ration all compensation received from rendering professional services. 49 The
contract stipulated that each physician receive certain benefits, including:
four weeks paid vacation, disability payments, permission to attend and
compensation for expenses of educational programs, and specific payments
on termination of employment.50
Termination of a shareholder from NHRA without good cause was
possible only by a three-fourths vote of the membership. 5' All of the stock-
holders' employment agreements were identical, except that Hyland was re-
quired to give six months notice prior to resignation. 52 At the age of fifty-
one, Hyland was asked to leave NHRA by a unaminous vote of the mem-
bership. 53 As the basis of its decision, NHRA cited "complaints of appellant's
unavailability, lack of cooperation and abusive conduct." ' 54 Subsequently,
43. This professional corporation was organized under the laws of Connecticut
in 1972 to provide radiology services in New Haven, Connecticut. Hyland v. New
Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 794 (2d Cir. 1986).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 794-95.
47. Id. at 794.




52. The agreement between NHRA and Dr. Shapiro, the corporation's pres-
ident, was also somewhat different from the rest in that it provided for a $500 a
month payment to a deferred compensation account to replace a benefit Dr. Shapiro
had lost from another source when he joined NHRA. Hyland v. New Haven Ra-
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Hyland and NHRA entered into an agreement specifying, among other things,
the terms of his termination as "an employee, shareholder, director and
officer of the corporation." 55 Severance pay, a lump-sum withdrawal and
the repurchase of appellant's shares were all included in this post-employment
contract.
5 6
Hyland initiated a cause of action for age discrimination under the
ADEA against NHRA, and the other shareholders individually.1 NHRA
moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not an "employer" and
Dr. Hyland was not an "employee" for purposes of the ADEA. The district
court agreed with NHRA in stating that it had chosen the corporate form
of doing business merely "to gain advantageous tax and civil liability treat-
ment," but that in reality NHRA was more like a partnership than a cor-
poration.56 In addition, the trial court ruled that while NHRA could be
classified as an "employer" as defined by the ADEA, Hyland was not an
"employee," because the corporation functioned more like a partnership,
and he could not separate his ownership/management role so as to be con-
sidered an "employee." 5
9
The ADEA applies only to those individuals who are or are about to
be in a "direct employment relationship" at the time of the alleged age
discrimination. 60 In analyzing the case, the Second Circuit followed prior
authority in observing that the ADEA was established as a remedial meas-
ure.6' Accordingly, it should be interpreted broadly to bring about its in-
tended results in the employment arena.
62
The court looked to previous decisions construing the three closely re-
lated discrimination acts: the ADEA, the FLSA and Title VII. Because of
their similar purpose, i.e., to stamp out discrimination in employment, and
nearly identical definitional sections, the court was persuaded by these earlier
opinions to interpret the ADEA in a similar manner.63 Where the foregoing
statutes have been applied, it has been held that one's status as an officer,
director or major stockholder of a corporation does not prohibit being si-





59. This was so because NHRA was for most intents and purposes a "part-
nership" and Hyland as a "partner" could not separate his proprietary roles so as
to be deemed an "employee." Id.
60. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 796; see Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979,
980-81 (4th Cir. 1983).
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ership and employment relationships are not mutually exclusive. 65
Notwithstanding the court's agreement that the remedies provided by
the anti-discrimination acts do not apply to "partners" (as potential plain-
tiffs) in a true partnership, once an employment contract is created the ADEA
strictures apply and dictate certain areas of that employment relationship. 6
While the district court ignored the form of business association entered
into by the original radiologists, the appellate court refused to say NHRA
was effectively a "partnership." 67 The Second Circuit chose not to adopt the
economic realities test used by the lower court, which was first utilized by
the courts to differentiate an employee from an independent contractor. 68
The most important factor of consideration under this test is the extent of
control the employer has over the purported employee in performing his
work duties. 69
When distinguishing an employee from a partner or independent con-
tractor, the economic realities test may be appropriate. 70 However, such an
examination is irrelevant when attempting to classify as a partner one as-
sociated with a corporation, because one cannot be a partner and also own
shares in the same firm. 7' The court held that if persons opt to use the
corporate form of business, for whatever reasons, it is not material that the
entity is structured and operated like a partnership. 72
Dr. Hyland's position in NHRA was simultaneously one of officer,
director, shareholder and employee. This conclusion follows from the court's
finding that no inherent inconsistency existed between an ownership/man-
agement interest and an employment relationship. 73 This finding was bols-
tered by the existence of an employment agreement detailing terms and
conditions of employment, and specifically delineating Hyland as an "em-
ployee" of NHRA. 74 Ultimately, the appellate court reversed the district
court's summary judgment and remanded the cause of action to determine
if Hyland had been in fact discharged in violation of the ADEA.75
INTER-CIRCUIT COMPARISONS
Relying on prior Internal Revenue Service caselaw, the district court in
Hyland stated the general rule that the law will ignore an entity's legal status
65. Id.
66. Id. at 797.
67. The district court reasoned that Hyland, as one of the founding "part-
ners," could not also be an "employee" with standing to invoke the ADEA. Hyland,
794 F.2d at 797.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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if the result would otherwise place form over substance. 76 Likewise, the dis-
senting opinion of Judge Cardamone in Hyland expressed the view that the
way in which a business functions, rather than the business form, should
determine how it will be treated under the various discrimination acts. 77
A recent Eighth Circuit decision, EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and
Co.,78 allowing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to subpeona
documents and records of a partnership, illustrates the opposite side of the
form over substance argument. The tribunal addressed the ADEA definition
of "employee," and stressed that the label given a position by a firm, e.g.,
partner, is not dispositive of how it will be treated under the ADEA. 79 Whether
or not one is an "employee" should rest on the facts of each case, because
the statutory definition in the discrimination acts is not restrictive. 0
In EEOC v. The First Catholic Slovac Ladies Association,8 ' the Sixth
Circuit held that corporate officers were also employees for purposes of age
discrimination:
These individuals performed traditional employee duties: maintaining rec-
ords, preparing financial statements, managing the office. They were re-
sponsible for their work to the governing body of the organization and they
drew salaries as employees. Their participation on the policy-making Board
of Directors does not detract from their primary role as employees.8
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit warned that employers cannot circumvent the
ADEA by categorizing as directors or independent contractors those who
meet the statutory definition of an employee.83 The question seems to be
"whether an employer-employee relationship exists, not what title a worker
holds."8 4
Dr. Hyland initially argued, and maintained throughout his lawsuit, that
NHRA was a corporation which should not have been treated like a part-
nership under any circumstances. In addition, there is some support for a
secondary argument proffered by Dr. Hyland: treating NHRA as a partner-
ship via the entity theory.8 5 The trial court recognized this creative argument
76. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 606 F. Supp. 617, 619 (D.
Conn. 1985).
77. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 798-99 (2d Cir.
1986).
78. 775 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1985).
79. Id. at 930; see also EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d
1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983).
80. See Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977).
81. 694 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983).
82. Id. at 1070.
83. See Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 352 n.4
(7th Cir. 1983).
84. Id.
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of Dr. Hyland, who employed the entity doctrine of partnerships. 86 Arguably,
if NHRA had person status as a legal entity separate and distinct from its
members, and controlled the conduct and compensation of those sharehold-
ers, they should conceptually be denominated employees.87 But assuming that
partners cannot also be employees, as most courts have held, what test should
be utilized to distinguish employees from partners?
In Burke v. Friedman,88 the Seventh Circuit addressed this exact question
in a Title VII case, where the court found partnership and employee status
to be mutually exclusive. Typically, a partnership exists where "persons join
together their money, goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying on
a trade, profession or business and when there is community of interest in
the profits and losses. "89 Partners who manage and control a business cannot
at the same time be considered employees.
Another Seventh Circuit decision, EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd,90 is in direct
opposition to the Second Circuit opinion of Hyland. This case held that a
professional corporation of attorneys did not meet the definition of an "em-
ployer" under Title VII, because the shareholders could not be counted
toward the threshold of fifteen "employees" required by the Act. 9' The
EEOC as plaintiff brought the action on behalf of a female secretary, who
was admittedly a proper "employee" to bring a sex discrimination suit. 92 In
espousing the principle of substance over form the Seventh Circuit reasoned
that a professional corporation is more like a partnership than a regular
corporation; it was therefore appropriate to categorize a shareholder as a
partner, rather than as an employee. 93
Attempting to reduce the confusion, the Second Circuit in Hyland gave
a short history of the caselaw surrounding the discrimination acts. 94 Although
similar to other measures used, the EEOC created its own test to determine
whether or not one should be deemed a partner or employee: "[t]he Com-
mission will consider relevant factors including, but not limited to, the in-
diviual's ability to control and operate the business and to determine
compensation and the administration of profits and losses." 95 At common
86. Id. at 620.
87. Id.
88. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
89. Id. at 869. The Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership as "an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
Partners manage and control the business and share in the profits and losses. UNir.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1) (1969).
90. 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
91. Id. at 1178.
92. Id. at 1177.
93. Id. at 1178.
94. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 796.
95. Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797.
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law, courts used an agency test to differentiate an employee from an inde-
pendent contractor, but this examination works better in the respondeat
superior/tort liability context. 96 Later, courts developed the economic realities
test for distinguishing employees and independent contractors in the discrim-
ination law area.Y However, the majority and dissent agreed that this was
an inappropriate standard under the facts of Hyland.98
Lacking any valid precedent on which to rely, the district court in Hyland
utilized the economic realities test and found that the "[NHRA] amounts to
a partnership in all but name."99 NHRA had a structure and organization
of even distribution in ownership, management and sharing of profits and
losses, which are all classic attributes of a partnership. 1°° The Seventh Circuit
in EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, summarized the situation:
The principal advantages gained by attorneys and other professionals who
incorporate concern tax and civil liability (citation omitted). Shareholders in
a professional corporation are not immune from malpractice liability. The
economic reality of the professional corporation in Illinois is that the man-
agement, control and ownership of the corporation is much like the man-
agement, control and ownership of a partnershiplol
Not to be left out, the dissenting judge in Hyland developed his own test
for distinguishing partners from employees. He noted that the ADEA does
not explicitly require that anyone who works for a corporation be axiomat-
ically deemed an "employee. '0 2 When a violation of the ADEA is alleged,
courts should examine a two-tier analysis when deciding if an individual, in
what amounts to an effective partnership, is best categorized as an employee
or a true partner: (1) compensation-whether profits and losses were shared
according to a predetermined formula, and (2) control-responsibility vis-a-
vis the other partners. 03
CONCLUSION
By formulating a rigid rule of law in Hyland that a shareholder who
works for a professional corporation is an "employee" for purposes of the
ADEA, there is now a definite split between the Second and Seventh Circuits.
Unfortunately, confusion and unpredictability are the ultimate results of such
96. Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Mandatory Re-
tirement of Law Firm Partners, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1679, 1688 (1980).
97. 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986).
98. Id. at 798, 801-02.
99. Hyland, 606 F. Supp. 617, 621 (D. Conn. 1985).
100. Id.
101. EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (citations
omitted).
102. Hyland, 794 F.2d 793, 799 (2d Cir. 1986).
103. Id. at 802.
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a split. Hyland directly conflicts with the Seventh Circuit holding in Dowd
& Dowd, which, unlike Hyland, allows courts to look behind the labels given
to a firm and those individuals associated with it.
Although the Eighth Circuit has not faced a situation with shareholders
in a professional corporation, its decision in Peat, Marwick indicates that
form will not be exalted over substance in the context of employment dis-
crimination. All businesses in general, and professional corporations in par-
ticular, should be wary of labeling workers as anything other than "employees"
simply to avoid liability under the ADEA. It is difficult to assess how sig-
nificant an effect the Second Circuit's decision will have, but it should be
heeded by employers contemplating such measures as mandatory retirement
before the age of seventy. Problems are likely to arise with the rule of law
applied by Hyland, because carried to its extreme, form will undoubtedly
win over substance in some cases. An arguably favorable result of this de-
cision is that individuals will still be protected even when there is a share-
holder agreement that provides for termination of a member without good
cause. Nevertheless, the decision suffers from significant over-inclusiveness,
and perhaps problems of this magnitude are best handled on an ad hoc basis.
A final word on the subject is painfully absent; so, until the United States
Supreme Court deals with this issue, employers and their counsel should be
aware of all the possible approaches courts take in determining standing and
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